Academic Positions:

• Yale University
• April 2005-present: Allison Foundation Professor of Philosophy
  
• July 2000-present: Professor of Philosophy
  
• July 1998-June 2000: Associate Professor of Philosophy
  
• Rice University
  
• July 1996-June 1998: Associate Professor of Philosophy
  
• July 1993-June 1996: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
  
• Sept. 1990-June 1993: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, New York University
• Sept. 1985-June 1990: Teaching Assistant, Associate, Fellow, UCLA

Areas of Comp.:
History of Modern Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion
 

Education:

• UCLA, 1984-1990: M.A., Philosophy, 1986; Ph.D., Philosophy, 1990
• Dissertation: "Knowledge, Epistemic Possibility, and Scepticism"; Advisor: Rogers Albritton
• Awards: Carnap Essay Prize, 1990; Griffin Fellowship, 1990; Carnap Essay Prize (co-winner), 1989;  Robert M. Yost Prize for Excellence in Teaching, 1988
• Calvin College, 1980-1984: B.A., Philosophy major, 1984

Graduate: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics (all multiple times), Teaching College Philosophy (taught to first-time TA's at UCLA)

Upper Division: History of Modern Philosophy (Descartes to Kant survey course, topics courses, single figure courses); Philosophy of Religion; Theory of Knowledge; Topics in Metaphysics and Epistemology; Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics (all multiple times)

Lower Division: Introduction to Philosophy; Philosophy track of DS (Yale's Directed Studies program for freshman); Symbolic Logic; Skepticism and Rationality; Contemporary Moral and Legal Issues; (all multiple times); Humanities Core Course (Rice); Free Will, God and Evil; Critical Reasoning
 
 

Publications:  (many of these papers are available on-line here)

• "'Bamboozled by Our Own Words': Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  
• "Direct Warrant Realism," in A. Dole and A. Chignell, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 150-172.
• "The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 172-198.
  
• "Single Scoreboard Semantics," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 1-21.
• "Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 22-41.
• "The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 346-350.
• "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context," Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 167-203.
• To be republished in The Philosopher's Annual, vol. 26.
  
• "How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats?", The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
• "Now You Know It, Now You Don't," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 91-106.
• "Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 697-706.
• "Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?" Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 385-413
• "Conditional Assertions and 'Bisquit' Conditionals" (with Richard E. Grandy), Noûs 33 (1999): 405-420.
• "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 187-205.
• Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, edited with T. Warfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
• "Responding to Skepticism," in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (1999), pp. 1-24.
• "Simple Might's, Indicative Possibilities, and the Open Future," The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 67-82.
• "Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 568-580.
• "Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): pp. 193-197.
• "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 1-52.
• Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual, vol. 18 (Atascardero, CA: Rigeview Publishing Company, 1997).
• Reprinted in E. Sosa, J. Kim, ed., Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
• Reprinted in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 183-219.
• "Lewis on 'Might' and 'Would' Counterfactual Conditionals," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994): pp. 413-418.
• "Descartes, Epistemic Principles, Epistemic Circularity, and Scientia," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992): pp. 220-238.
• "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): pp. 913-929.
• Reprinted in M. Huemer, ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002)
• Reprinted in L. Alcoff, ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998).
• "Deterrent Threats: What Can Matter," Philosophical Studies 67 (1992): pp. 241-260.
• "Epistemic Possibilities," Philosophical Review 100 (1991): pp. 581-605.
• "Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): pp. 497-512.
• "Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism," Philosophical Review, 98 (1989): pp. 313-348.

• Review of Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 573-577.
• Review of Avrum Stroll, Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 238-241.
• "Contextualism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy -- Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996).
• "Relevant Alternatives," Encyclopedia of Philosophy -- Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996).
• Review of William L. Rowe, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): 945-949.
• Review of Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 604-607..

• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," Princeton University, Sept. 23, 2005.
  
• "'Bamboozled by Our Own Words': Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism," Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 6, 2005.
  
• "Universalism, Open Theism, and Calvinism," Calvin College, March 9, 2005. [talk hand-out (pdf document)]
  
• "Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments against Contextualism," Cornell University, September 10, 2004.
  
• "The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism," "Epistemological Contextualism" conference, University of Stirling, March 20, 2004.
• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," University of Dundee, March 17, 2004.
• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," University of Glasgow, March 16, 2004.
• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," University of Texas, Austin; March 8, 2004.
• Commentator, along with Steven Pinker, for Richard Dawkins's Tanner Lectures; Harvard University; Nov. 19-21, 2003.
• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Oct. 31, 2003
• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," University of Arizona; Oct. 24, 2003
• "Externalism and Skepticism," University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Colloquium; Oct. 11, 2003
• "Single Scoreboard Semantics," "Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond" conference; UMass, Amherst; Oct. 11, 2002.  With comments by Richard Feldman.
• "The Conditionals of Deliberation," University of Michigan; September 27, 2002.
• "Reidian Epistemology," at the "God and the Ethics of Belief" Conference in Honor of Nick Wolterstorff, Yale University, April 20, 2002.
• "Single Scoreboard Semantics," April 4, 2002, and "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context," April 5, 2002, University of Miami.
• "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context," Keynote address at the Rocky Mountain Student Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder, Feb. 22, 2002
• "The Warranted Assertability Objection," Brown University; March 17, 2001
• "Elusive Skepticism," New York University; December 1, 2000
• "Assertability in Context," University of Notre Dame; May 8, 2000
• "Voodoo Epistemology", comments on Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief; Society of Christian Philosophers group meeting at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association; Boston; December 29, 1999
• "How Not Be a Hero in Responding to Skepticism," CUNY Graduate Center Colloquium; November 10, 1999
• "How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats?", at the 1999 Spindel Conference; University of Memphis; October 2, 1999.  With comments by Timothy Williamson.
• Comments on Richard Feldman's paper, "The Ethics of Belief"; Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, New Jersey; April 23, 1999
• "Knowledge, Assertion, and Context," at the Fifth Annual Franklin & Marshall College Symposium in Metaphysics and Epistemology; April 10, 1999
• "Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?", comments on Alvin Plantinga's paper, "Warranted Christian Belief"; Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association; Washington, D.C.; December 28, 1998
• "Now You Know It, Now You Don't," at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy; Boston, Massachusetts; August 13, 1998
• "Does God Know What We Would Freely Do?", Southern Methodist University; March 26, 1998
• "Context, Knowledge, and Assertion," University of Vermont; November 7, 1997
• "Contextualism, Knowledge, and Assertion," at the 1997 International Colloquium on Cognitive Science; San Sebastian, Spain; May 8, 1997
• "Contextualism, Knowledge, and Assertion," Rutgers University, March 13, 1997
• "Contextualism, Knowledge, and Assertion," Yale University, March 4, 1997
• "Descartes and Modality," Notre Dame University, January 31, 1997
• "Knowledge and Warranted Assertability," Syracuse University; February 22, 1996
• "Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?" Rice University; Sept. 21, 1994
• "Solving the Skeptical Puzzle," Rice University, February 11, 1993
• "Solving the Skeptical Puzzle," University of Virginia, Charlottesville, January 18, 1993
• "The Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 15, 1992
• "The Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism," University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, January 8, 1992
• "Wittgenstein's Suspicion and the Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism," Fordham University, December 5, 1991
• "Bold Skeptics and Airplane Spotters," C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center, March 27, 1991
• "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," UCLA; University of Connecticut, Storrs; Temple University; Tulane University; Winter, 1989-90